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OF AGRICULTURE v. MORENO:
REINVIGORATED EQUAL PROTECTION FOR
WELFARE RECIPIENTS
Congress passed the Food Stamp Act of 19641 in order "to safeguard
the health and well-being of the Nations [sic] population and raise
levels of nutrition among low-income households" and to "promote
the distribution in a beneficial manner of our agricultural abun-
dances .... ". At the time of passage, section 3 (e) of the Act defined
"household," the unit of eligibility, as "a group of related or non-re-
lated individuals, who are not residents of an institution or boarding
house, but are living as one economic unit sharing common cook-
ing facilities and for whom food is customarily purchased in com-
mon." The Act was amended in January 1971 to define "household"
as "a group of related individuals (including legally adopted children
and legally assigned foster children) or non-related individuals over
age 60 .... 4
Five groups of plaintiffs brought a class action against the Depart-
ment of Agriculture challenging the relationship requirement, alleg-
ing that they met all the other eligibility requirements and were ex-
cluded from the Food Stamp Program because they either lived with,
or were sharing their home with, persons to whom they were not re-
lated. In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno5 the
United States Supreme Court affirmed a three-judge district court
ruling that the classification was in violation of the equal protection
component of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.7
1. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-25 (1970), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2012(e), (h),
2019(c), (e), 2023(e) (Supp. II, 1972).
2. 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1970).
3. Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, § 3(e), 78 Stat. 703 (em-
phasis added).
4. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1970)
(emphasis added).
5. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
6. Moreno v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 345 F. Supp. 310 (D.D.C.
1972). For a discussion of the district court opinion see 41 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
135 (1972).
7. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment does not apply to
the federal government. The due process clause of the fifth amendment, however,
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The Supreme Court, applying "traditional" equal protection analy-
sis, found that no legitimate governmental purpose was furthered by
the classification. Specifically, the Court held that the relatedness or
unrelatedness of the members of eligible households was irrelevant to
the Food Stamp Act's express purposes, i.e., the improvement of nu-
trition among poor people and the distribution of agricultural sur-
pluses. The Court also found that an unstated congressional intent
to discriminate against "hippies," reflected in the legislative history,
was not a legitimate governmental interest.8 The Government had
argued that the classification should be upheld as an attempt to
prevent fraud, since Congress might have found unrelated households
more likely to abuse the program and more unstable so that abuses
would be harder to detect. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court rejected
this argument.9
The test under traditional equal protection is whether a legislative
classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental in-
terest.10 The classification's reasonableness is determined by the de-
gree to which it similarly treats persons similarly situated in relation
is the vehicle for applying equal protection standards to federal actions. Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
8. The legislative history on § 3(e) of the Act was sparse. The amendment
was first added by the Conference Committee, having appeared in neither the
House nor the Senate version of the bill. The Conference Report stated: "The
House Bill did not alter the definition of 'household' under section 3(e) of the
Act. The conference substitute contains language which is designed to prohibit
food stamp assistance to communal 'families' of unrelated individuals." H.R. REP.
No. 91-1793, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1970). All of the available references to the
amendment supported this interpretation. See 116 CoNe. REc. 43325-27, 44430-32
(1970).
A general principle of equal protection is that if the purpose of a statute is
discriminatory, the statute will be invalidated. Parr v. Municipal Court, 3 Cal. 3d
861, ..... ., 479 P.2d 353, 355, 92 Cal. Rptr. 153, ............ (1971); Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. Rav. 341, 342, 358
(1949); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAav. L. Rnv. 1065,
1081 (1969); Comment, The Evolution of Equal Protection-Education, Municipal
Services, and Wealth, 7 HA{v. CIv. RIOHTS-CIV. LiB. L. Rxv. 103, 141 (1972).
The Moreno Court found that an intent to bar a politically unpopular group from
participation in the Food Stamp Program is not a legitimate governmental in-
terest. 413 U.S. at 534.
9. 413 U.S. at 535-36.
10. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961);
F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
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to the purpose of the classification." Courts have traditionally
searched for "any state of facts which would sustain the classification's
rationality [that] can be reasonably conceived."12 If such an interest
can be found, the court is obligated to sustain the classification, 3 and
this tendency has been especially evident in the social and economic
area.1' The result has been a traditional equal protection analysis that
is "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact."' "5
The leading welfare case applying this traditional approach is
Dandridge v. Williams,6 which held that the imposition of a state
maximum grant system, beyond which benefits would not be increased
regardless of family size, did not unconstitutionally discriminate be-
tween children in large and small families. The Dandridge Court
found the classification in issue to be justified by the possible state
interest in maintaining the balance between welfare families and the
working poor and in encouraging recipients to seek gainful employ-
ment. 7 This denial of benefits to otherwise eligible individuals was
upheld through an explicit judicial search for possible legislative
purposes,'8 an endeavor typical of traditional equal protection analy-
sis.19
11. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 8, at 344.
12. Developments in the Law, supra note 8, at 1083.
13. Dienes, To Feed the Hungry: judicial Retrenchment in Welfare Adjudica-
tion, 58 CAUF. L. Rzv. 555, 605 (1970); Developments in the Law, supra note
8, at 1083.
14. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Gunther, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAuv. L. Rav. 1,
23 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther]; Developments in the Law, supra note
8, at 1080-81.
15. Gunther 8.
16. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
17. Id. at 486.
18. Id. at 485, citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
19. It is possible to interpret Dandridge as a case permitting a reduction in,
not elimination of, family benefits. This is clearly within the power of a state.
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 413 (1970). Under this interpretation,
Dandridge could then be distinguished from Moreno, in which the challenged
statute denied any benefits to otherwise eligible individuals. Dandridge would,
under this view, no longer be precedent for Moreno, and the cases would merely
stand for the proposition that as long as the government is not totally denying
benefits, it has wide leeway to consider factors other than need in its determina-
tion of benefit levels.
This interpretation of Dandridge, however, would be erroneous. Certainly, the
effect of the denial was to reduce the overall family benefit because payments to
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The governmental interest suggested in Moreno-the prevention of
fraud-is as reasonable as were the interests found sufficient in Dand-
ridge. Given the continued vitality of Dandridge, the result in Mor-
eno seems to be a departure from the usual equal protection outcome.
There are two possible alternatives that explain the instant case:
either the Court is moving toward strict scrutiny in the welfare area
or an evolution of equal protection doctrine is in progress.
20
the other children and the caretaker are stretched to provide for the children who
are rendered ineligible by the maximum grant provision. Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1970). But this effect does not reflect the actual theory
under which benefits are calculated-the total denial of aid to later-born children,
ineligible solely because of order of birth. Both Dandridge and Moreno are denial
cases.
20. There is a third possibility, found decisive by the district court and Justice
Douglas, who concurred with the Supreme Court majority. Both Justice Douglas
and the district court emphasized first amendment problems raised by § 3(e) of
the Act.
In the district court Moreno decision, the Government argued that Congress
may have been trying to discourage communal living popularly associated with
hippies and that Dandridge required the court to uphold the statute on the basis
of any reasonable purpose. 345 F. Supp. at 312. The court declined to do so,
finding that a congressional "attempt to regulate morality would raise serious
constitutional questions." Id. at 314. The court found a possible first amendment
problem: "Recent Supreme Court decisions make it clear that even the states,
which possess a general police power not granted to Congress, cannot in the name
of morality infringe the rights to privacy and freedom of association in the home."
Id. (emphasis in original).
As pointed out by the Supreme Court majority, 413 U.S. at 535 n.7, the
morality argument was abandoned by the Government and not presented to the
Court. Nevertheless, Justice Douglas found the first amendment impact of § 3(c)
to be significant: "But for the constitutional aspects of the problem, the
'unrelated' person provision of the Act might well be sustained as a means to
prevent fraud. . . . I could not say that this 'unrelated' person provision has no
'rational' relation to control of fraud. We deal here, however, with the right of
association, protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 543.
It is apparent that Justice Douglas is concerned with Dandridge, as indicated
by his explicit attempt to distinguish the case, and with the established rule that
any reasonable purpose will be sufficient to protect a statute in the economic and
social area against constitutional challenge. Id. at 544. He felt that the
prevention of fraud might be such a purpose. This conclusion was also reached by
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, who dissented on the ground
that prevention of fraud is a rational basis for the statute and that once such a
basis is found, the Court's function is over. Id. at 546.
Neither the district court nor Justice Douglas dealt with the contention that,
while government cannot dictate associations between people, it is not required
to subsidize any and all relationships. Cf. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971);
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
[Vol. 8:289
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In the last decade, there has been short-lived speculation that cate-
gories based on wealth would become suspect classifications, giving
rise to strict scrutiny21 This hope (or fear) was based on a series of
cases containing dicta suggesting that classifications involving the poor
would automatically invoke the higher equal protection test.22 Each
of these cases, however, involved some protected interest,23 and it was
the combination of these protected interests with the wealth factor
that resulted in the application of strict scrutiny.24 The effect of this
combination was reiterated by the Court in the recent case of San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez:25
The individuals, or groups of individuals, who constituted the
class discriminated against in our prior [wealth] cases shared two
distinguishing characteristics: because of their impecunity they
were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a
21. Bendich, Privacy, Poverty, and the Constitution, in THE LAw OF THE PooR
83, 97 (J. tenBroek ed. 1966); Gunther 8-9; Michelman, The Supreme Court,
1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 83 HA.v. L. Rrv. 7, 19, 22 (1969).
22. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969)
("And a careful examination on our part is especially warranted where lines
are drawn on the basis of wealth or race, . . . two factors which would inde-
pendently render a classification highly suspect and thereby demand a more
exacting judicial scrutiny."); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[The majority suggests] that the 'compelling interest'
test is applicable merely because the result of the classification may be to deny
the appellees 'food, shelter, and other necessities of life' . . . .") ; Harper v. Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) ("Lines drawn on the
basis of wealth or property, like those of race . . . are traditionally disfavored.") ;
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) ("In either case [denial of free
transcript or counsel on appeal] the evil is the same: discrimination against the
indigent. For there can be no equal justice where the kind of an appeal a man
enjoys 'depends on the amount of money he has.' "); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12, 17 (1956) ("In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account
of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color.").
23. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) (voting);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (travel); Harper v. Virginia State
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963) (criminal appeals); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(criminal appeals).
24. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
Michelman, supra note 21, at 22, 24; Comment, The Evolution of Equal Pro-
tection, supra note 8, at 106.
25. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
1974]
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consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a mean-
ingful opportunity to enjoy that benefit ....
[T]his Court has never heretofore held that wealth discrimination
alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny .... 20
Clearly, then, Moreno does not represent a rekindling of the wealth-is-
suspect theory. The case must be interpreted in some other fashion.
The second, alternative explanation of Moreno is that an evolution
of equal protection doctrine is in progress. Professor Gerald Gunther
has analyzed the 1971 term of the Supreme Court and found that in
five out of fifteen basic equal protection cases the Court either
upheld the constitutional challenge or remanded after explicitly voic-
ing traditional equal protection doctrines,2 7 a development he found
"truly startling and intriguing."218 In these cases29 Gunther sees sig-
nificant evidence of a move by the Court toward a new, "rational
basis" equal protection model that would replace the two-tier ap-
proach developed and refined by the Warren Court:
The model suggested by the recent developments would view
equal protection as a means-focused, relatively narrow, preferred
ground of decision in a broad range of cases. Stated most simply,
it would have the Court take seriously a constitutional require-
ment that has never been formally abandoned: that legislative
means must substantially further legislative ends.
The intensified means scrutiny would, in short, close the wide
gap between the strict scrutiny of the new equal protection and
the minimal scrutiny of the old not by abandoning the strict but
by raising the level of the minimal from virtual abdication to
genuine judicial inquiry.-0
26. Id. at 20, 29.
27. Gunther 11 n.48.
28. Id. at 19.
29. Gunther bases his model on seven cases, sustaining or remanding equal
protection claims, in which strict scrutiny was not mentioned. Only five of those
cases, however, explicitly adopted the traditional equal protection test. Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), "proves on analysis to be only marginally an equal
protection case," having focused its discussion on procedural due process. Gunther
25. That ground was not argued in the lower court and, therefore, was not avail-
able to the Supreme Court as a ground for decision. In Weber v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), the Court did not clearly specify the equal pro-
tection standard being applied. For discussion of the balance of the cases see notes
34-38 and accompanying text infra.
30. Gunther 20, 24.
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One of the major elements of the "rational basis" model is the
Court's reluctance to invent any reasonable governmental purpose3 1
or to defer automatically to such a purpose when offered3 2 Rather,
the Court appears more willing to question the actual relationship
between the classification and the ends sought to be achieved. In Reed
v. Reed, 3 for example, the Court found that "the objective of reduc-
ing the workload on probate courts by eliminating one class of con-
tests is not without some legitimacy." 3' Yet the Utah Probate Code's
mandatory selection of a man over a woman in the same preference
category of prospective estate administrators was not allowed to stand.
Similarly, in Eisenstadt v. Baird-s the state's interests in health and
morality were found insufficient to justify a statute discriminating
between marrieds and unmarrieds in their access to contraceptives.
Again, in Humphrey v. Cadys6 the Court found that denial of a hear-
ing for recommitment to state prison under the Wisconsin Sex Crimes
Act, when a hearing was provided under the Mental Health Act for
commitment to a mental hospital, raised an equal protection claim
substantial enough to warrant remand. The state's arguments that
commitment was imposed in lieu of sentence and that the special
characteristics of sex offenders made a jury determination inappropri-
ate were rejected.37
Despite his suggestion of a new equal protection approach, two
other cases led Gunther to doubt that the Court will apply the "ra-
tional basis" model to areas of legislation, such as welfare, in which
31. See notes 12-13 and accompanying text supra.
32. Gunther 21.
33. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
34. Id. at 76.
35. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
36. 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
37. Id. at 510-12. The other cases are James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972)
(Kansas recoupment statute denying to indigent defendants the exemptions, ex-
cept the homestead exemption, available to other judgment debtors discriminated
against one class of judgment debtors for no rational reason) and Jackson v. Indi-
ana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (procedures for commitment of incompetent defendant
violated equal protection because he was subjected to more lenient commitment
and more stringent release standards than persons not charged with offenses, and
violated due process because he was indefinitely committed solely on account of
incompetency to stand trial).
19741
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it has customarily shown restraint. 38 In both Jefferson v. Hackneys t
and Richardson v. Belchero the welfare/equal protection cases de-
cided in the 1971 term, the Court cited Dandridge with approval
and applied the traditional equal protection approach of searching
out, and giving deference to, possible and reasonable legislative pur-
poses.41
Moreno is significant not only because its substantive examination
of the government's proffered purpose42 supports the rational basis
model4 3 but also because the case suggests use of rational basis analy-
sis even in welfare cases. If the Court is moving toward an "invigo-
rated" rationality scrutiny in the welfare area, the hopes of welfare
litigants, disappointed when benefits were not accorded the status of
38. Gunther 32. There is, however, evidence to the contrary, suggesting
that the Court may expand the use of heightened scrutiny into unaccustomed
areas. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the Court dismissed an argu-
ment based on the state's interest in protecting public health. Health, like social
and economic regulation, has been an area of judicial deference. Williamson v.
Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), in-
volved estates, another area that is not standard Supreme Court fare. Gunther 32.
39. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
40. 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
41. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher,
404 U.S. 78, 81-83 (1971).
42. See text at note 9 supra.
43. Another major element of Gunther's model is its potential as an avoidance
technique, useful in permitting the Court to avoid thornier constitutional prob-
lems. Gunther 26-30. Moreno may also support this element of the model. Gunther
points out that reliance on equal protection in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972), permitted the Court to avoid the issue of "what constitutional justifica-
tions permit detention of an ill individual," which Gunther considers "a venture
into that uncertain realm of ultimate constitutional values." Gunther 28. And in
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), "the core of the challenge... was an
effort to expand the boundaries of the amorphous right of privacy of Griswold v.
Connecticut [381 U.S. 479 (1965)]." Gunther 29.
Arguably, Moreno also involved the issue of privacy. The Supreme Court ma-
jority's footnote 7, 413 U.S. at 535, can be interpreted as a relieved dismissal of
the complex first amendment problems, much as Gunther interprets Eisenstadt. It
is not altogether clear, however, that the failure to present the morality argument
before the Court eliminated the first amendment considerations. The Brief for
Appellees at 33-61, United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973), was devoted, in large part, to a first amendment argument. As previously
noted, Justice Douglas also considered the rights of privacy and association to be
deeply involved in the case. See note 20 supra.
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a "right 44 and when wealth was not deemed a suspect classification,45
may be rekindled. These developments, solidified by Dandridge, re-
sulted in the virtual impotence of equal protection as a tool for chal-
lenging classifications in the welfare field.46 Yet the actual examina-
tion of proffered purposes, the process used in Moreno, may signal a
new trend that will be significant for future welfare cases. The con-
straint of Dandridge, representing the "emasculation of the Equal
Protection Clause as a constitutional principle applicable to the area
of social welfare administration, 47 may have been broken.
Margaret Howard
44. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
45. See notes 21-26 and accompanying text supra.
46. Dienes, supra note 13, at 605.
47. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508 (1970) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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